This article describes and discusses the ideas of Patrick Heelan about the nature of visual perception, which he argues as not being intrinsically Euclidian, but rather as being described both in Euclidian and not-Euclidian geometries. Another objective is to place Heelan’s ideas in the context of the attempts to grasp the nature of science from the hermeneutical standpoint, in agreement with the so called analytical philosophy of science, noticing that his philosophical perspective is determined by phenomenology, in particular that inspired (...) by Heidegger. Heelan’s phenomenology and philosophy of science are innovative and original deserving to be described and analysed. It is proposed that the investigation of Heelan’s project opens up new perspectives in both phenomenology and philosophy of science. (shrink)

Through the analysis of the thought of Mach and Duhem, who have felt the need to re-evaluate the relationship between metaphysics and physics, we study in what measure the authors had a position relating to an eventual weakening of the traditional epistemic criteria, which were until their time used for the evaluation of scientific theories, and those criteria should respect the distinction between fact and value. We investigate the way each argues for a division between science and metaphysics, as well (...) as the reasons for this. For both authors, adopting mechanicism as the basis for modern science is in the origin of the emergence of the materialist metaphysics, which should now be abandoned. Every metaphysics built from physical results would be a disrespect to the distinction between fact and value. Duhem and Mach argue for a new role for the common sense, which should not be taken as the source of error anymore. (shrink)